The distinction between abstract and concrete concepts is fundamental to cognitive linguistics and cognitive science. This distinction is commonly operationalized through concreteness ratings based on the aggregated judgments of many people. What is often overlooked in experimental studies using this operationalization is that ratings are attributed to words, not to concepts directly. In this paper we explore the relationship between the linguistic properties of English words and conceptual abstractness/concreteness. Based on hypotheses stated in the existing linguistic literature we select a (...) set of variables and verify whether they are statistically associated with concreteness ratings. We show that English nouns are rated as more concrete compared to other parts of speech, but mass nouns are rated as less concrete than count nouns. Furthermore, a more complex morphological structure is associated with abstractness, and as for etymology, French- and Latin-derived words are more abstract than words of other origin. This shows that linguistic properties of words are indeed associated with the degree of concreteness that we attribute to the underlying concepts, and we discuss the implications that these findings have for linguistic theory and for empirical investigations in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

Extensive and critical review of Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl and McDowell, written by van Mazijk, Corijn focussing on his discussion of McDowell.

An introduction to philosophy of language since Frege, focusing on the 20th century.

F. Brencio (2023), Embodied Attention. A phenomenological hypothesis, in D. Stoyanov (Ed.), Contemporary Neuropsychiatry: Implications from Cognitive Neuroscience, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, pp. 26-42.

Despite the importance of commitment for distinctively human forms of sociality, it remains unclear how people prioritize and evaluate their own and others’ commitments - especially implicit commitments. Across two sets of online studies, we found evidence in support of the hypothesis that people’s judgments and attitudes about implicit commitments are governed by an implicit sense of commitment, which is modulated by cues to others’ expectations, and by cues to the costs others have invested on the basis of those expectations.

It is well known that Hermann Cohen was one of the first philosophers who engaged in the debate about non-Euclidean geometries and the concept of space. His relation to Hermann von Helmholtz, who played a major role in the same debate, is an illuminating example of how some of the leading ideas of Marburg neo-Kantianism, although motivated independently of scientific debates, naturally led to the examination of scientific works and scientists’ epistemological views. This paper deals with Cohen’s view of magnitudes (...) and measurement and with his – less known – review of Helmholtz’s paper “Zählen und Messen, erkenntnistheoretisch betrachtet”, which contains one of the first attempts to formulate a theory of measurement in the modern sense. The first part provides a brief introduction to this debate in its connection with the earlier discussion on geometrical axioms and the concept of space. The main sections deal with Helmholtz’s and Cohen’s approaches to the foundations of measurement. Cohen’s criticism of some of Helmholtz’s assumptions notwithstanding, my emphasis is on some unexpected affinities between these two approaches. In the concluding section, I rely on the constructive side of Cohen’s criticisms to reconsider the philosophical aspects of Helmholtz’s theory and draw a few comparisons with contemporary measurement theory. (shrink)

Through this contribution I aim to explore the horizons and limits of digital medicine in light of an embodied approach to the issue of care. I will sketch the historical background of digital medicine and show the contemporary status of this interdisciplinary field, as well as its applications and outcomes. Then, I will address a critique of the computational theory of mind (CTM) upon which many contemporary mental health apps are designed. This approach to the mind is inscribed into the (...) modern trend of neuromania, which conceives the embodied, living human being as a mere series of data analyses and algorithms, with the brain as the seat of the person. Drawing on continental philosophy and classical phenomenology I will develop a notion of health conceived as a moral enterprise, showing how wellbeing and vitality are not reducible to a product made by technologies or doctors, but rather they are the results of an embodied encounter. As such, empathy and person-centered care cannot be achieved by digital medicine. They are the result of a journey into the regions of recognition, embodied presence and the aliveness constituting the person. Finally, I will show how the issue of care cannot be separated from an embodied encounter between people, especially in case of dementia. (shrink)

The global spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) or coronavirus disease 19 (COVID-19) has led to the imposition of severely restrictive measures by governments in the Western hemisphere. We feel a contrast between these measures and our freedom. This contrast, we argue, is a false perception. It only appears to us because we look at the issue through our contemporary moral philosophy of utilitarianism and an understanding of freedom as absence of constraints. Both these views can be (...) substituted with more sophisticated alternatives, namely an ethics of virtue and a notion of freedom of the will. These offer a fuller picture of morality and enable us to cooperate with the current restrictions by consciously choosing to adhere to them instead of perceiving them as draconian and immoral. We ask whether we should collaborate with the restrictions and argue that considerations of virtue will lead to an affirmative answer. More broadly, virtue ethics permits to deal with the practical concerns about how an individual should behave during this pandemic, given the current lockdown measures or lack thereof. -/- In section 1, we present how utilitarianism and a notion of freedom as negative liberty support the opposition to restrictive measures. In section 2, we outline an alternative based on an ethics of virtue and a more elaborated notion of free will. In the concluding section 3, we argue that considerations of virtue should guide the individual and public response to the emergency. (shrink)

What is a gene? Does it represent a natural kind, or is it just a tool for genomics? A clear answer to these questions has been challenged by postgenomic discoveries. In response, I will argue that the gene can be deemed a natural kind as it satisfies some requirements for genuine kindhood. Specifically, natural kinds are projectible categories in our best scientific theories, and they represent nodes in the causal network of the world (as in Khalidi. Natural Categories and Human (...) Kinds: Classification in the Natural and Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013; Khalidi. Synthese 195: 1379–1396, 2018; Khalidi. Are Sexes Natural Kinds, In: Dasgupta S, Weslake B (eds) Current Controversies in Philoso-phy of Science. Routledge, New York, 2020; Khalidi. Philos Sci 88:1–21, 2021). In Sect. 2, I will present a brief history of the gene and the controversy over its status. In Sect. 3, I will introduce the account of natural kinds considered in this paper. In Sect. 4, I will first present the relevant definition of genes and how they can be classified. Then, I will argue that the gene can be considered a natural kind as it satisfies the criteria for natural kindhood. Section 5 concludes. (shrink)

An inquiry drawing on the presence of Hellenistic philosophy in Philo provides a better knowledge of the diffusion of Hellenistic philosophy since the late ...

The topic tackled in this book is Philo's account of the complex, double-sided nature of God's acting - the two-sided coin of God as transcendent yet immanent, ...

F. Brencio (2022), «…this phenomenon, which is none too happily designated as ‘empathy’». Martin Heidegger’s critique of empathy, in “Bollettino Filosofico”, 37, 243-251, ISSN: 1593 – 7178, E-ISSN 2035 - 2670.

In this paper I examine one well-known attempt to justify the claim that thoughts are intrinsically structured, Evans’s justification of the Generality Constraint. I compare this with a rival account, proposed by Peaocke. I end by suggesting that a naïve, Aristotelian realist has no difficulty at all in providing a justification of the Generality Constraint, which is therefore a view that deserves serious consideration.

Central to the legal positivism of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century was the dogma of the Ideal Legislator. Legal materials were to be interpreted as the work of an omniscient, coherent, consistent legislator. We argue that this dogma persists in the different guise of the competent speaker model, on which legal materials are the work of a competent speaker, who follows all the pertinent semantic and pragmatic rules. We will first lay out the Ideal Legislator (...) dogma as applied in legal interpretation, arguing that this dogma does not limit interpretive discretion but rather amplifies it by hiding it under the veil of an inexistent, purely instrumental rationality. We will then turn to the competent speaker model, showing that, despite its apparent neutrality, it proves to be a reincarnation of the Ideal Legislator dogma, for it, too, amplifies interpretive discretion, only it hides it under the veil of an inexistent, purely linguistic rationality. Finally, we will inquire into the different types of rationality and their relations, arguing that there is always a choice and value judgment involved in ascribing rationality to legislators, and that these choices and judgments need to be carefully inspected and normatively justified. (shrink)

Function talk is a constant across different life sciences. From macro-evolution to genetics, functions are mentioned everywhere. For example, a limb’s function is to allow movement and RNA polymerases’ function is to transcribe DNA. Biochemistry is not immune from such a characterization; the biochemical world seems to be a chemical world embedded within biological processes. Specifically, biochemists commonly ascribe functions to biomolecules and classify them accordingly. This has been noticed in the recent philosophical literature on biochemical kinds. But while a (...) lot has been written on biological and psychological functions, little has been said explicitly about biochemical fuctions. Here, I explore functional attribution to biochemical molecules. I argue that if we accept this attribution, then biochemical functions are constituted by chemical dispositional properties that causally contribute to selected biological processes. In section 2, I discuss the controversy concerning the characterization of biochemical functions. In section 3, I consider whether a biological or a chemical under- standing of function can be applied to biochemical functions, illustrating the account with the example of vitamin B12. The result is that none of the theories on their own provides an adequate characterization. In section 4, I present an account of biochemical functions. In section 5, I assess this account taking into consideration common requirements for a theory of functions and an objection. (shrink)

F. Brencio (2023), Quel che resta delle cose. Riccardo de Biase lettore di Heidegger, in G. Giannini, P. Marangolo, M. Papa (eds.), Segni. Studi in memoria di Riccardo De Biase, TAB Edizioni, Roma 2023, pp. 171-182, ISBN: 978-88-9295-769-5.

Criminal liability for acts committed by AI systems has recently become a hot legal topic. This paper includes three different contributions. The first contribution is an analysis of the extent to which an AI system can satisfy the requirements for criminal liability: accomplishing an actus reus, having the corresponding mens rea, possessing the cognitive capacities needed for responsibility. The second contribution is a discussion of criminal activity accomplished by an AI entity, with reference to a recent case involving an online (...) bot, the Random Darknet Shopper. This discussion will provide the context for the analysis of commonalities and differences between criminal activities by humans and by artificial systems. The third contribution concerns the evaluation of different ways of addressing criminal activities by AI systems in a regulatory perspective. (shrink)

In recent years, bioethical discourse around the topic of ‘genetic enhancement’ has become increasingly politicized. We fear there is too much focus on the semantic question of whether we should call particular practices and emerging bio-technologies such as CRISPR ‘eugenics’, rather than the more important question of how we should view them from the perspective of ethics and policy. Here, we address the question of whether ‘eugenics’ can be defended and how proponents and critics of enhancement should engage with each (...) other. (shrink)

Michael Ayers’s Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a New Empiricism is a rich and detailed development of two ideas. The first is that perception presents reality to us directly in a perspicuous way. We thus acquire primary knowledge of the world: “knowledge gained by being evidently, self-consciously, in direct cognitive contact with the object of the knowledge.” (Ayers 2019, 63) The second idea is that concepts are not needed in perception. In this article, the author examines Ayers’s view. The author (...) proceeds as follows: In the first section, he identifies the target of Ayers’s attacks, conceptualism. He then describes why many philosophers have felt this conceptualist view to be attractive. In the next section, he discusses Ayers’s criticisms of conceptualism in an attempt to disentangle these criticisms from the statement of his positive view, which the author discusses in the following section. He ends by describing some problems for Ayers’s positive position that are, so he argues, the result of his vehement opposition to conceptualism. (shrink)

In this paper, we will explore the relation between molecular structure and functions displayed by biochemical molecules in complex physiological processes by using tools from the philosophy of science and the philosophy of scientific practice. We will argue that biochemical functions are weakly emergent from molecular structure by using an account of weak. In order to explore this thesis, we will consider the role of vitamin B12 in contributing to the process of erythropoiesis. The structure of the paper is the (...) following: First, we will consider biochemical functions and why they cannot be easily reduced to their chemical realisers. We will suggest weak emergence as an alternative while also accounting for the relevance of the context, in our case, systemic and organisational. The paper will conclude by considering (1) how the usage of tools from the philosophy of science, such as weak emergence, can aid our understanding of the relations between the components of complex phenomena, such as erythropoiesis, and (2) how the philosophy of scientific practice sheds light on the explanatory role of processes that are dynamically stabilised and the different levels of organisation implied. (shrink)

Objects of knowledge exist within material, immaterial, and conceptual worlds. Once the world is conceived from the perspective of others, the physical ontology of modern science no longer functions as a standard by which to understand other orderings of reality, whether from ethnographical or historical sources. Because premodern and non-western sources attest to a plurality of sciences practiced in accordance with different ways of worldmaking from that of the modern West, their study belongs to the history of science, the philosophy (...) of science, and the sociology of science, as well as the anthropology of science. In Worldmaking and Cuneiform Antiquity, Francesca Rochberg extends an anthropology of science to the historical world of cuneiform texts of ancient Babylonia. Exploring how Babylonian science has been understood, she proposes a new direction for scholarship by recognizing the world of ancient science, not as a less developed form of modern science, but as legitimate and real in its own right. (shrink)

In his examination of the concepts of evil and impermanence, entitled “Evil and the Problem of Impermanence in Medieval Japanese Philosophy”, Yujin Nagasawa addresses four responses to the problem of impermanence, arguing that the only satisfactory response to the problem leads to an implication about supernaturalism. As Nagasawa puts it, “the problem of impermanence can be construed as a partial argument for supernaturalism and against naturalism”. In response to Nagasawa, I will take up the challenge of naturalism by trying to (...) deconstruct the arguments against indifferentism in order to reformulate and thus strengthen Nagasawa’s response to the problem of impermanence. I will then turn to the radicalization of this thesis by drawing out implications through a comparison with Dōgen’s thought. (shrink)

Metaphor has been considered as a cognitive process, independent of the verbal versus visual mode, through which an unknown conceptual domain is understood in terms of another known conceptual domain. Metaphor might instead be viewed as a cognitive process, dependent on the mode, which leads to genuinely new knowledge via ignorance. First, I argue that there are two main senses of ignorance at stake when we understand a metaphor: we ignore some existing properties of the known domain in the sense (...) that we disregard or neglect them; we ignore some “non-existing” properties of the known domain in the sense that they are not a piece of information belonging to the known domain, but emerge in metaphor interpretation. Secondly, I consider a metaphor as a reasoning device, guiding the interpreters along a path of inferences to a conclusion, which attributes to the target some properties of the source. In this path, interpreters might discover the ignored existing properties of the known domain and/or recover the “non-existing” properties, inferring or imagining the missing piece of information. Finally, I argue that, especially in visual metaphors, this process is guided by a “sentiment of rationality”, tracking a disruption of existing familiar conceptualisations of objects and/or actions and a recovery of ignored properties. (shrink)